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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. JOHNSON and 
PATRICIA·JOHNSON, 
Respondents, 
Case No. 14807 
vs. 
C. E. CARMAN, aka CAL E. 
CARMAN, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from the lower court's determination 
that respondents should not forfeit all payments made under a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract after respondents defaulted on the 
contract. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
A non-jury trial was held on September 9, 1976 in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding. By a 
memorandum decision dated September 13, 1976, the lower court 
entered judgment for respondents in the sum of $8,845.00 with 
interest, determining that to allow appellant to retain this 
amount as liquidated damages was unconscionable. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the lower court's decisic:. 
reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and respondents entered into a contract 
for the sale of appellant's land to respondents (R. 4). Pur· 
suant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated May 31 1911, 
the contract price was $170,000.00. On May 3, 1975, respon· 
dents paid $20,000.00 down, leaving a contract balance of 
$150,000.00. Under the terms of the contract, respondents 
were to pay the balance commencing June 15, 1975, at the pre 
determined rate of $1, 4 77 .11 per month for 12 months. A ba:· 
loon payment would then be due in the sum of $15,000.00. :: 
the next 12 months respondents were again to have paid $1/1 
per month for 12 months. At the end of this second period, 
balloon payment would be due of $7, 649. 36. After this seco: 
balloon payment the balance, together with interest at the P 
of 8-1/2% per annum would be paid in equal monthly installei~ 
of $1,428.57 for 120 months. 
Respondents performed under the terms of the con'.'., 
. ct,I 
until the early part of 1976, when respondents went into · 
Respondents also failed to maintain insurance or. the subjeC: 
property. that 
the contr4 It was agreed between the parties 
The c: 
would be altered to give some relief to respondents. 
-2-
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tract was altered on March 22, 1976 (R.6). The alteration 
provided that the contract balance would be $150,000.00, but 
that respondents would owe no balloon payments in any given 
year and, further, the monthly payment was reduced to $1,301.80. 
The provisions were incorporated into the original contract 
(R.7) and it was agreed that all other provisions, including 
forfeiture and penalty clauses, would remain in force. 
Payments under the altered contract were to commence 
April 1, 1976. Respondents made the first payment and then 
defaulted on the altered contract. In May, 1976 the record 
shows (T.8,9) respondents approached appellant and indicated 
that they were unable to continue with the contract. Appellant 
then sent respondents a proper demand notice (R.9). According 
to the record, respondents called appellant to take over the 
property on May 24, 1976 (T.28). 
After having entered the premises, appellant was 
approached by respondents to see if he could arrange something 
about retaining their equity (T.9). From the record no parti-
cular agreement appears. On June 3, 1976 respondents, through 
counsel, sent a letter to appellant asking appellant to quit 
the premises (T.56) or a suit would be instituted on behalf of 
respondents. This suit was filed on June 17, 1976. 
The Court made findings of fact (R.31) pursuant to 
its memorandum decision (R.30) finding that payments had been 
made by plaintiffs to defendants as follows: 
-3-
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Downpayment 
Payments on principal 
Payments on interest 
TOTAL 
$20,000.00 
3,839.31 
10,756.79 
$34,495.75 
r 
h . I Furt er, the court found that defendant had sustained~ •• 
as follows: 
Interest on $150,000.00 
to May 24, 1976, at 
8-1/2% per annum 
Benefit of bargain 
Attorneys fees 
Reasonable costs to 
restore premises 
TOTAL 
$14,485.00 
5,500.00 
1,165.00 
4,500.00 
$25,650.00 
Based thereon the court found that the forfeiture of $8,rn. 
as liquidated damages was disproportionate to defendant's ad 
loss and entered judgment accordingly. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLANT SHOULD 
RETAIN NOTHING BEYOND ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CONTRARY 
TO LAW AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS WHEN CONSIDERING ALL OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract which is the sub· 
ject of this litigation appears at pages 4 and 5 of the rec; 
Paragraph 16A of that contract contains the following langc 
"A. Seller shall have the right, upon 
failure of the Buyer to remedy the default 
within five days after written notice, to 
be released from all obligations in law and 
in equity to convey said property, and all 
payments which have been made theretofore 
on this contract by the Buyer, shall be 
forfeited to the Seller as liquidated dam-
ages for the non-performance of the contract, 
and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at 
his option re-enter and take possession of 
-.d- • 
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said premises without legal processes as in 
its first and former estate, together with 
all improvements and additions made by the 
Buyer thereon, and the said additions and 
improvements shall remain with the land be-
come the property of the Seller, the Buyer 
becoming at once a tenant at will of the 
Seller;" 
As is evident from the language, this paragraph is 
the forfeiture clause which is the subject of this suit. No 
one, at this late date in the development of contract law, 
can seriously contend that forfeiture clauses are per se un-
conscionable. The question is not the validity of forfeiture 
clauses as such, but whether or not the forfeiture is so 
grossly disproportionate to the actual damages that the con-
scious is abhorred by the enormous windfall granted. This 
is in fact the rule in the State of Utah. Perkins v. Spencer, 
121 Ut. 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952); Jacobsen v. Swan, 7 Ut.2d 
420, 326 P.2d 712 (1954); Peck v. Judd, 7 Ut.2d 420, 326 P.2d 
712 (1958); Cole v. Parker, 5 Ut.2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956); 
Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Ut.2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958); Strand 
v. Mayne, 14 Ut.2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Kay v. Wood, Utah, 
549 P.2d 709 (1976). 
The question before this Court must then be, is it 
unconscionable for appellant to retain all monies paid to him 
by respondents, i.e. $34,495.79. The answer to that question 
must be an unequivocal no. 
In Cole v. Parker, supra, this Court had occasion to 
indicate what criteria were to be taken into account to deter-
mine whether or not a forfeiture was a penalty. This Court said 
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at 5 Ut. 2d 267: 
"The ~riteria for determining whether a 
provisi~n in ~ contract amounts to a penalty 
or a fair estimate of damages sustained by the 
v:ndor. upon a breach of the contract was out-
lin:d in the case of Perkins v. Spencer, supra. 
It is there stated that at the time of the 
forfeiture, the court will consider the fo~ 
lowing elements in approximating the damage 
suffered by the vendor: 
"'l. Loss of an advantageous bar-
gain; 
2. Any damage to or depreciation of 
the property; 
3. Any decline in value due to change 
in market value of the property not allowed 
in items Nos. 1 and 2; 
4. For the fair rental value during the 
period of occupancy.'" 
(emphasis added) 
It can be readily seen from this criteria ~~b 
lower court did not even use the proper formula to arrive a: 
appellant's measure of damages. 
than a fair monthly rental value. 
The court used interest n': 
,cl The court gives no rea. 
the discrepancy and under all the above cited cases, intere 
is not criteria. The criteria is rental. The lower court· 
perhaps mislead by respondents' reliance on Kay v. Wo~, 5' 
' ,., 
in which Justice Ellett cites figures in his dissenting 0h 
.j 
Even a cursory reading of that dissent will indicate that•· 
Ellett is merely comparing figures for his own purposes. i 
does not purport to give any formula. 
Appellant testified that a fair rental value wa: 
tween $1500.00 and $1700.00 per month (T.26). He indicate: 
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that a rule of thumb was 10% of the fair market value and that 
his figure was based on his previous earnings over the four 
years prior to the sale. None of these sums were contested by 
counsel for respondents. In fact, at page 54 of the trial 
transcript respondents introduced evidence that for the fiscal 
year 1974, the net profit was $16,956.00, or an average of 
$1,413.00 per month. 
Pursuant to appellant's suggested fair rental value 
of between $1500.00 and $1700.00 per month, the yearly rental 
would be between $18,000.00 and $20,400.00. Consequently, for 
the 13 months of dispossession the fair rental value would be 
between $19,500.00 and $22,100.00. If one adds to these 
figures the other credits allowed appellant as determined by 
the lower court, appellant's total credit is between $29,165.00 
and $31,565.00. Therefore, the amount actually forfeited by 
respondents would be between 2% and 3% of the total contract 
purchase price. 
Once the lower court determined what the actual or 
reasonable damages were to appellant it seemed to work on the 
assumption that everything paid over and above that figure be-
longed to respondents. such is not the law in this jurisdiction 
and never has been. In Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Ut.2d 96, 485 P.2d 
673 (1971), this Court specifically rejected such a doctrine at 
26 Ut.2d 97: 
"The plaintiffs' demand seemed to be 
Premised on the idea that those decisions 
~tand for a general proposition that if the 
buyer under such a real estate contract can-
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-.. 
not perform, he can relinquish the property 
and demand reimbursement under an accounting 
which, roughly stated, charges him for the 
reasonable rental value plus any damages 
suffered by the seller, and credits him with 
any amounts he has paid in excess thereof. 
Those cases do not give support for any 
such general proposition as advocated by 
plaintiffs." 
{emphasis added) 
Furthermore, in Carlson v. Hamilton, supra, where 
the issue was raised with specific figures and percentages 
in much the same circumstances as the case at bar, this ide: 
was clearly and correctly rejected. At 8 Ut. 2d 274, this Cc: 
had the following to say: 
"The trial court made findings as to 
the amount of damage done and added to it 
a reasonable two-year rental value, con-
cluding the plaintiffs had paid $2,119.94 
more on the contract than defendants actually 
had been damaged. Plaintiffs were awarded 
judgment for that amount, apparently under 
the theory that in Perkins v. Spencerl we 
determined that a defaulting buyer could 
require the return of all sums paid in 
over and above actual damage caused the 
seller. 
"Perkins v. Spencer is no authority for 
such doctrine. The spirit of that case calls 
for adhesion to a principle that equity his-
torically has indulged,--that it abhors un-
conscionabili ty shocking to such degree ~hat 
the function of equity would be mis conce1 ved 
and misapplied by the enforcement of such 
unconscionability, even though it may have 
been the subject of contract. 
· b · 1 · · b · ous i' n the 
"Such unconsciona 1 1ty is o vi d 
Perkins case, where, after a breach committe 
only four months after execution of the c~~ 
tract, an exaction of over 27% of the entire p 
purchase price was attempted,--$2, 725 · 00 w~~~; 
the price was $10,000.00, and where t~e 5~efore 
demanded the entire balance of the price 
I 
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conveying the property. In the instant 
case, the amount of damage that the con-
tract said could be considered as liqui-
dated damages was $2,119.94. Occupancy 
had been enjoied a full two years. The 
bona fides of the sellers generously was 
demonstrated by a volunteered waiver of 
the principal for the time being if the 
buyers would but pay the taxes and inter-
est. The amount of damages here was but 
9-1/2% of the purchase price, an amount 
that would exceed but little the real 
estate commission that would have to be 
paid on resale of the property that 
defendants took back without fault on 
their part, from those who caused all 
the difficulty by breaking the contract. 
"The two cases are poles part, the 
one obviously being punctuated by uncon-
scionability, the other appearing to call 
only for the exaction of a reasonably small 
percentage of the price for a breach that 
would cause delay for repairs, time lapse 
for re-sale, and possibly other items of 
damage susceptible of little but conjec-
tural measurement." 
(emphasis added) 
It will be noted that in Carlson v. Hamilton, supra, 
the sale price was $22,000.00. The 9-1/2% mentioned by the 
Court has reference to the amount retained by seller after he 
had already been credited with his damages. In the instant 
case, based on the rentals suggested by appellant, the amount 
retained by the seller after credits for damages would only 
be 3%, at the most, of the contract price. Even under the lower 
court's figures, the amount retained by appellant would only be 
5.2%. In every particular, except as to length of time, Carl-
~ is on "all fours" with the instant case and appellant con-
tends that it should be controlling and dispositive of this case. 
-9-
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear from a review of the evidence and lai 
in this case that the lower court was clearly wrong in awari 
anything to respondents and appellant respectfully submits 1 
this Court that the lower court's decision should be reversi: 
with costs to appellant. 
DATED this 24th day of March, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
j/;1;JJcP~ 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
Attorney for Appellant 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah ~ill 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to Mr. Matt Biljani: 
Attorney for respondents, 7355 South 9th East, Midva~.~ 
84047, on this 25th day of March, 1977. 
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